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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of ReligionVolume 7$
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Jonathan Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198757702

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 03 July 2022

Evil and Evidence

Evil and Evidence

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Evil and Evidence
Source:
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion
Author(s):

Matthew A. Benton

John Hawthorne

Yoaav Isaacs

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001

The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA (Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access), epistemic appearances, ‘gratuitous’ evils, ‘levering’ evidence, and the representativeness of goods. This chapter aims to dispel some confusions about these notions, in particular by clarifying their roles within a probabilistic epistemology. In addition, the chapter develops new responses to the problem of evil from both the phenomenal conception of evidence and the knowledge-first view of evidence.

Keywords:   Evil, evidence, probabilistic epistemology, skeptical theism, knowledge-first

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