Much research has highlighted that sub-state entities (SSEs)—such as the German Länder, the Spanish autonomous communities, or the French regions—mobilize at the European level. This literature, however, is silent on how this sub-state activity interacts with that of its own member state. Do SSEs lobby in Brussels with their member state (cooperation), without their member state (non-interaction), or against their member state (conflict)? This book fills this research gap by 1) identifying what the pattern of interaction between state and sub-state EU interest representation corresponds to and ... More

Much research has highlighted that sub-state entities (SSEs)—such as the German Länder, the Spanish autonomous communities, or the French regions—mobilize at the European level. This literature, however, is silent on how this sub-state activity interacts with that of its own member state. Do SSEs lobby in Brussels with their member state (cooperation), without their member state (non-interaction), or against their member state (conflict)? This book fills this research gap by 1) identifying what the pattern of interaction between state and sub-state EU interest representation corresponds to and by 2) identifying what the determinants of such a pattern are. To achieve this double task, quantitative and qualitative methods are employed. The quantitative section consists of regression analysis on data collected through a survey addressed to heads of regional offices in Brussels (n=104). It highlights that cooperation is the most frequent outcome, followed by non-interaction. Conflicting interest representation is the least frequent outcome. Further analysis reveals that devolution levels do not affect conflict but increase the frequency of cooperation and decrease that of non-interaction. Meanwhile, party political incongruence fails to affect conflict, decreases cooperation, and increases non-interaction. This quantitative work is complemented by a series of in-depth case study analyses of Scotland (UK), Salzburg (Austria), Rhône-Alpes, and Alsace (both France). Based on more than one hundred semi-structured interviews, the case studies confirm the overall findings reached through quantitative means and further suggest that the effect of devolution overrides that of party political incongruence. Additional statistical testing confirms this inductive finding.