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The Epistemic Life of GroupsEssays in the Epistemology of Collectives$
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Michael S. Brady and Miranda Fricker

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198759645

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759645.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 July 2021

Fault and No-Fault Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice

Fault and No-Fault Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice

A Space for Epistemic ‘Agent-Regret’

(p.33) 2 Fault and No-Fault Responsibility for Implicit Prejudice
The Epistemic Life of Groups

Miranda Fricker

Oxford University Press

Other things being equal, prejudicially biased judgements are epistemically blameworthy. In this chapter I ask whether there are there circumstances under which we may be guilty of implicit prejudice and yet not epistemically blameworthy. Where this is the case, we see a space for no-fault epistemic responsibility—the epistemic analogue of ‘agent regret’. This epistemic counterpart of Bernard Williams’s original notion demarcates a space of no-fault epistemic responsibility where, crucially, the subject incurs ameliorative epistemic obligations. Finally it is argued that in most cases such individual obligations will either already constitute or else quickly generate collective or institutional obligations to improve the epistemic environment—which is just as well, given that institutional bodies have far greater power to change things for the better.

Keywords:   responsibility, prejudice, agent-regret, blameworthy, Bernard Williams, obligations

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