Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
Gila Sher
Abstract
The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation”–the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom) knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a grounding in both world and mind. With the ... More
The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation”–the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom) knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a grounding in both world and mind. With the fall of foundationalism, however, many philosophers have become skeptical about a substantive philosophical grounding of knowledge. This essay challenges this skepticism by charting a new foundational methodology, “foundational holism”, which is designed to provide all knowledge with a dual grounding in world and mind using holistic principles. Employing this methodology, the essay develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic. This theory includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge inspired by Quine yet opposed to his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist theory of truth that advocates universal correspondence yet rejects the rigid and overly simplistic conception of traditional correspondence, and (iii) a new foundation for logic, demystifying its grounding in the world. This foundation brings logic in line with other fields of knowledge while affirming its strong necessity, generality, and normativity, which are explained by its “semantic formality”. The essay engages with multiple philosophers and philosophical views, setting the ground for further discussions of both freedom and friction.
Keywords:
basic human epistemic situation,
epistemic friction,
epistemic freedom,
foundational holism,
dynamic model of knowledge,
substantivist theory of truth,
grounding for logic,
correspondence,
semantic formality,
Quine
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2016 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780198768685 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2016 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198768685.001.0001 |