Aesthetic Sensibility, Epistemic Virtue, and Emotional Sharing
Aesthetic Sensibility, Epistemic Virtue, and Emotional Sharing
Goldie offers a ‘virtue theory of art’ or a theory committed to the idea that engaging in ‘artistic activity’ is constitutive of human well-being. This chapter does not take issue with the general virtue-based approach Goldie defends or the notion of character upon which it relies. Instead, it focuses on some of the ideas at the heart of the account and possible ways in which they may be developed: in particular, the claim that artistic virtue is a kind of virtue in its own right, to be contrasted in important respects with moral and epistemic virtue. Drawing on some of Goldie’s conceptual resources in another context, additional pressure is applied to the relation between artistic and epistemic virtue in order to see what form a successful virtue theory of art might take and whether the proposed taxonomy of virtue can stand up to scrutiny.
Keywords: Keywords virtue, well-being, emotions, narrative, activity, value, education, knowledge
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