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Systemic Risk, Institutional Design, and the Regulation of Financial Markets - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Systemic Risk, Institutional Design, and the Regulation of Financial Markets

Anita Anand

Abstract

Following the recent financial crisis, regulators have been preoccupied with the concept of systemic risk in financial markets, believing that such risk could cause the markets that they oversee to implode. At the same time, they have demonstrated a certain inability to develop and implement comprehensive policies to address systemic risk. This inability is due not only to the indeterminacy inherent in the term ‘systemic risk’ but also to existing institutional structures which, because of their existing legal mandates, ultimately make it difficult to monitor and regulate systemic risk across ... More

Keywords: systemic risk, institutions, coordination, soft law, systemic shocks, risk-taking, regulation, managerial prosecution, institutions, macroprudential regulation, market confidence, financial stability, sunsetting, Volcker rule, Dodd-Frank, proprietary trading, pre-crisis, reforms, Renminbi, banking, Eurozone, central bank, bailout, liquidity

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2016 Print ISBN-13: 9780198777625
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777625.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Anita Anand, editor
J.R. Kimber Chair in Investor Protection and Corporate Governance