This last chapter reviews some of the important conclusions of the book. First, it discusses empirical findings that show that the lack of a majority government increases the complexity of bargaining, makes changing the status quo more difficult, and favors centrist parties. Second, it highlights how some Latin American presidents benefit from substantial institutional prerogatives over the congressional agenda, while others are more restricted by the rules in place. Third, it describes the cross-national variation found in terms of legislative productivity and approval rates of bills initiated by presidents and members of congress. The brief concluding remarks connect some of the relevant findings regarding institutional prerogatives and positional advantage to the book’s introductory chapter on agenda setting in Latin American countries.
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