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Humean NatureHow desire explains action, thought, and feeling$
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Neil Sinhababu

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198783893

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783893.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 January 2022

Metaethics for Humean Beings

Metaethics for Humean Beings

Chapter:
(p.188) 11 Metaethics for Humean Beings
Source:
Humean Nature
Author(s):

Neil Sinhababu

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783893.003.0011

Chapter 11 explains how the Humean Theory supports a cognitivist and externalist view of moral judgment. Cognitivist internalist views and some sophisticated noncognitivist views identify moral judgment with motivational states other than desire, which aren’t found in actual human psychology. This leads these views into incapabilism, the disastrous conclusion that human beings can’t make moral judgments. The facts of human psychology instead suggest experientialism, the view that moral judgments are beliefs about when feelings like guilt, horror, and admiration accurately represent objective reality. The book concludes by noting Hume’s emphasis on elegantly explaining behavior and phenomenology, which provides the methodological foundations for his psychological theory.

Keywords:   Desire, Ethics, Motivation, Noncognitivism, Psychology, Hume, Experientialism

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