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Humean NatureHow desire explains action, thought, and feeling$
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Neil Sinhababu

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198783893

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783893.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 January 2022

Moral Judgment

Moral Judgment

(p.63) 4 Moral Judgment
Humean Nature

Neil Sinhababu

Oxford University Press

Chapter 4 introduces the emotional perception model of moral judgment and the experientialist analysis of moral concepts. Emotional dispositions produce motivation as well as feelings that cause beliefs in objective moral properties. This view is cognitivist and externalist about moral judgment while remaining true to the Humean Theory. The way moral feelings cause moral belief and help us acquire moral concepts is analogous to the role of color experience in causing color belief and helping us acquire color concepts. This analogy is borne out by recent psychological research. Moral concepts apply to the objective properties that would make moral feelings accurate.

Keywords:   Desire, Morality, Color, Motivation, Emotion, Emotional Perception, Experientialism

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