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Humean NatureHow desire explains action, thought, and feeling$
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Neil Sinhababu

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198783893

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783893.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 January 2022

Desire and Attention

Desire and Attention

(p.83) 5 Desire and Attention
Humean Nature

Neil Sinhababu

Oxford University Press

Desire directs attention at things we associate with its object. Chapter 5 uses this Attentional Aspect of desire to explain how premises and conclusions combine in practical reasoning, how we know what we’re doing when we engage in intentional action, why our thoughts about whether to believe that p are usually followed by thoughts about whether p, and how we daydream. While anti-Humeans raise some of these cases as counterexamples to the Humean theory, their own theories explain the phenomena less elegantly. That desire’s ability to direct attention explains such a broad range of deliberative phenomena is evidence for the Humean Theory.

Keywords:   Desire, Attention, Reasoning, Belief, Daydreaming

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