Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Humean NatureHow desire explains action, thought, and feeling$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Neil Sinhababu

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198783893

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783893.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 08 December 2021



(p.100) 6 Intention
Humean Nature

Neil Sinhababu

Oxford University Press

Chapter 6 argues that intentions are desires combined with means–end beliefs. This desire–belief account explains the role of intentions in both rational and irrational deliberation. Desire directs attention towards possible means for attaining its object, explaining the role of intentions in planning. Deliberation ends if we lack sufficient attentional resources, allowing for quick action but also for ill-considered and irrational decisions. Desire causes pleasure and displeasure as we think of its objects, explaining experiences of pleasure and displeasure in revising intentions. Joint intentions share these features of individual intentions, suggesting that they’re made of individual intentions which in turn are made of desire–belief pairs.

Keywords:   Desire, Belief, Intention, Reasoning, Attention

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .