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Humean NatureHow desire explains action, thought, and feeling$
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Neil Sinhababu

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198783893

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783893.001.0001

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(p.146) 9 Reasons
Humean Nature

Neil Sinhababu

Oxford University Press

Chapter 9 describes how desire makes us recognize reasons and act on them. The Attentional and Hedonic Aspects of desire give reasons a perceptual salience that lets us recognize them, and the Motivational Aspect makes us act for reasons. This explains when we act on advice about what we have reason to do, why some options look like genuine possibilities in deliberation while others don’t, how some desired options can be excluded from deliberation, and how we can act for one reason rather than another. It blocks arguments for treating reasons as Platonic facts, instead suggesting that reasons are natural facts seen in the light of desire. Furthermore, it suggests that moral facts aren’t facts about reasons.

Keywords:   Desire, Reasons, Reasoning, Ethics, Deliberation

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