Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Illusion of Doubt$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198783947

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198783947.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 November 2020

The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

(p.7) 1 The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments
The Illusion of Doubt

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

Oxford University Press

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments, and hence to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In this chapter I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.

Keywords:   closure principle, radical scepticism, perceptual reasons, Indistinguishability Argument, Reasons Identity Thesis

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .