Constitutional Policy in Multilevel Government: The Art of Keeping the Balance
Arthur Benz
Abstract
The search for a robust balance of power is a continuous challenge for multilevel political systems. Institutions like parliaments or courts can protect the existing order. However, necessary adjustments to economic, social or international challenges or policies determined to improve ineffective structures or to prevent disintegration require constitutional amendments. Whereas constitutional policy appears as essential to maintain balance, changing a constitution is rather difficult in multilevel governments. Due to the veto power of many actors pursuing divergent interests, policies aiming t ... More
The search for a robust balance of power is a continuous challenge for multilevel political systems. Institutions like parliaments or courts can protect the existing order. However, necessary adjustments to economic, social or international challenges or policies determined to improve ineffective structures or to prevent disintegration require constitutional amendments. Whereas constitutional policy appears as essential to maintain balance, changing a constitution is rather difficult in multilevel governments. Due to the veto power of many actors pursuing divergent interests, policies aiming to redistribute power or fiscal resources risk ending in the joint-decision trap. Hence, multilevel government is confronted by a fundamental dilemma. This book compares processes of constitutional reform in federal and regionalized states. Based on a theoretical framework emphasizing the relevance of negotiations in parliamentary, intergovernmental and societal arenas, it identifies conditions for successful reforms and explains the consequences of failed reforms. Moreover, it highlights the interplay of reform processes and constitutional evolution as essential to maintaining a robust balance of power. It demonstrates that an appropriate arrangement of multiple arenas of negotiation including executives, members of parliament and civil society organizations and sequential order of reform processes proves fundamental to prevent federal or regionalized governments from becoming either instable or ending with rigid constitutions.
Keywords:
balance of power,
constitution,
constitutional change,
federalism,
joint-decision trap,
multilevel government,
regionalization,
reform
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2016 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780198786078 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2016 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786078.001.0001 |