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Bolzano's Logical System$
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Ettore Casari

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198788294

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198788294.001.0001

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Theory of Knowledge

Theory of Knowledge

(p.275) 8 Theory of Knowledge
Bolzano's Logical System

Ettore Casari

Oxford University Press

Among the existing qualities occurring in the universe, there are psychic phenomena, which are qualities of those pure existing objects that are thinking beings, and among such phenomena, besides sensations, wishes, volitions, etc., there are those we may call ‘cognitive’, which are characterized by having to some lectological object the relation Bolzano called ‘having as material or content’. A psychic phenomenon the material of which is an idea is a (subjective) representation, whereas one having as material a proposition is a judgement. On this basis, Bolzano’s theory of knowledge is developed. Representations and judgements inherit their ‘logical properties’ from their material. So, for example, a representation is objectless or represents at least n objects if its material is objectless or refers to at least n objects, and a judgement is true (or a knowledge), respectively false (or an error), if such is the proposition constituting its material.

Keywords:   psychic phenomenon, representation, judgement, material, knowledge, error

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