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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 6$
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Mark Timmons

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790587.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 December 2021

Two Senses of Moral Verdict and Moral Overridingness

Two Senses of Moral Verdict and Moral Overridingness

Chapter:
(p.215) 10 Two Senses of Moral Verdict and Moral Overridingness
Source:
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 6
Author(s):

Paul Hurley

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790587.003.0011

This chapter distinguishes two senses in which philosophers speak of moral verdicts that invite two senses of moral overridingness. The first takes such moral verdicts to reflect decisive reasons for acting from a distinctively moral point of view; the second takes moral verdicts to reflect decisive reasons simpliciter for acting that are in some sense distinctively moral. Agents can be morally required to act in one of these senses without being morally required in the other, and the corresponding questions concerning whether or not morality is overriding differ significantly. Although the first of these senses of moral verdict currently dominates the moral overridingness debate, the focus here is primarily on the second, and the importance of disambiguating the two. Emphasizing the dominant sense to the exclusion of the alternative has fundamentally skewed debates in moral theory. The chapter offers a proposal for understanding the relationship between these two distinct senses.

Keywords:   moral verdict, moral overridingness, moral requirement, moral point of view, consequentialist, ought simpliciter, decisive reasons \

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