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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 6$
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Mark Timmons

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790587.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 27 January 2022

Extrinsic Value and the Separability of Reasons

Extrinsic Value and the Separability of Reasons

Chapter:
(p.166) 8 Extrinsic Value and the Separability of Reasons
Source:
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 6
Author(s):

Barry Maguire

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790587.003.0009

There is an interesting tension between certain value-based deontic theories (such as act consequentialism) and certain value-based theories of virtue (such as Thomas Hurka’s Recursive account). The tension arises in cases involving non-instrumental extrinsic value, for instance the value of sadness in response to tragedy. This tension prompts us to look for more sophisticated value-based deontic principles than act consequentialism. This chapter develops such principles. It argues that the weights of reasons to promote extrinsically valuable states of affairs are a function of the value of extrinsically valuable state of affairs and also the value of its condition. This yields a systematic restriction on the separability of reasons. The broadest goal of the chapter is to exhibit some of the resources available to value-based theories of reasons as part of a deontic theory sensitive to pretheoretic intuitions.

Keywords:   reasons, value, extrinsic value, final value, separability, additivity, Hurka, consequentialism, virtue

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