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Toleration and Understanding in Locke$
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Nicholas Jolley

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198791706

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791706.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 July 2021

Belief and the Will

Belief and the Will

(p.75) 5 Belief and the Will
Toleration and Understanding in Locke

Nicholas Jolley

Oxford University Press

It is sometimes said that Locke’s position on the nature of belief is inconsistent: in the Epistola de Tolerantia Locke argues that belief is not under our voluntary control, whereas in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he appears to say that it is. This chapter seeks to defend the overall consistency of Locke’s position on this issue. The chapter further examines Waldron’s criticism that, by admitting that at least the sources of belief are under our voluntary control, Locke opens up a ‘fatal crack’ in his case for religious toleration against Proast. It is argued that Locke can be defended against this criticism by drawing on his concept of sincere belief.

Keywords:   belief, Descartes, error, sincere belief, voluntary, Waldron

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