This chapter seeks to solve the puzzle of why Locke does not argue directly from natural law for religious toleration in the Epistola de Tolerantia. Locke’s failure to do so is puzzling since the doctrine of natural law plays a key role in the argument of the Second Treatise of Government. Various possible solutions to the puzzle are reviewed and found to be inadequate. It is argued that the most convincing solution is that Locke was reluctant to draw attention to his opposition to the ‘judicious Hooker’, a natural-law theorist who had argued that the promotion of the true religion is among the legitimate functions of government. It is also shown that, under pressure from Proast, Locke is forced to discuss the role of natural law in his thought about toleration.
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