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Political Determinants of Corporate GovernancePolitical Context, Corporate Impact$
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Mark J. Roe

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199205301

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205301.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 October 2021

Contract as Metaphor

Contract as Metaphor

(p.123) Chapter 17 Contract as Metaphor
Political Determinants of Corporate Governance

Mark J. Joe

Oxford University Press

The political problem of backlash is analogous to the economic problem of producing from a common pool. When a society has an asset that it uses in common, overusing it can destroy its value, and private economic incentives militate toward overusing a commonly-owned asset. To keep claims on the polity from overly destabilizing production, political deals that work, like economic common pool deals that work, may not be pretty and may not be efficient when compared to the ideal. These problems are best illustrates by the destructive drilling in the East Texas oil fields in the 1930s.

Keywords:   East Texas oil fields, common pool, unitization, overuse, Texas Railroad Commission

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