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Political Determinants of Corporate GovernancePolitical Context, Corporate Impact$
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Mark J. Roe

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199205301

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205301.001.0001

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Rents and Ownership Concentration

Rents and Ownership Concentration

Chapter:
(p.142) Chapter 20 Rents and Ownership Concentration
Source:
Political Determinants of Corporate Governance
Author(s):

Mark J. Joe

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205301.003.0021

When product market rents are higher, two key constraints on managers — product and capital market competition — weaken. When these constraints on managers weaken, managerial agency costs in the fully public firm and the demand for alternative means to reduce these costs rise. When product market rents are higher, all else being equal, ownership concentration also becomes higher. Meanwhile, as product increases, managerial agency costs inside the firm decrease.

Keywords:   product market rents, product competition, capital market competition, ownership concentration, national monopoly

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