- Title Pages
- Preface
- List of Graphs and Figures
- List of Tables
- Introduction
-
I Political Conflict and the Corporation -
Chapter 1 Peace as Predicate -
Chapter 2 The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures -
Chapter 3 A General Theory -
II Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance -
Chapter 4 Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes -
Chapter 5 Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control Managers -
III Left-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data -
Chapter 6 Data and Confirmation -
IV Nation by Nation -
Chapter 7 France -
Chapter 8 Germany -
Chapter 9 Italy -
Chapter 10 Japan -
Chapter 11 Sweden -
Chapter 12 United Kingdom -
Chapter 13 United States -
Chapter 14 Extending the Sample? -
V The Direction of Causality -
Chapter 15 Alternative Formulations of the Thesis -
Chapter 16 Backlash -
Chapter 17 Contract as Metaphor -
Chapter 18 Rents -
Chapter 19 Rents and Politics -
Chapter 20 Rents and Ownership Concentration -
Chapter 21 Political Change in Continental Europe -
Chapter 22 Alternative Formulations: Data -
VI Corporate Law's Limits -
Chapter 23 Corporate Law as the Foundation for Securities Markets: The Theory -
Chapter 24 Its Limits: Theory -
Chapter 25 Its Limits: Data -
Chapter 26 The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits -
VII Unifying Two Political Theories -
Chapter 27 Populism and Socialism in Corporate Governance - Conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- Bibliography
- Index
The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits
The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits
- Chapter:
- (p.194) Chapter 26 The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits
- Source:
- Political Determinants of Corporate Governance
- Author(s):
Mark J. Joe
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter demonstrates why the data indicates that the quality-of-corporate-law argument, although it explains transition economies nicely, is over-stated for several of the world's richest nations. In too many of them, even with good shareholder protection, stock can be sold, but ownership does not separate from control. Based on the data, several nations have good corporate law, but not much diffusion and separation. These nations also have a high potential for managerial agency costs: relatively weaker product market competition and relatively stronger political pressures on managers to disfavour shareholders.
Keywords: shareholder protection, corporate law argument, transition economies, managerial agency costs
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- Title Pages
- Preface
- List of Graphs and Figures
- List of Tables
- Introduction
-
I Political Conflict and the Corporation -
Chapter 1 Peace as Predicate -
Chapter 2 The Wealthy West's Differing Corporate Governance Structures -
Chapter 3 A General Theory -
II Social Conflict and the Institutions of Corporate Governance -
Chapter 4 Social Democracies and Agency Costs: Raising the Stakes -
Chapter 5 Reducing Shareholders' Power to Control Managers -
III Left-Right Politics and Ownership Separation: Data -
Chapter 6 Data and Confirmation -
IV Nation by Nation -
Chapter 7 France -
Chapter 8 Germany -
Chapter 9 Italy -
Chapter 10 Japan -
Chapter 11 Sweden -
Chapter 12 United Kingdom -
Chapter 13 United States -
Chapter 14 Extending the Sample? -
V The Direction of Causality -
Chapter 15 Alternative Formulations of the Thesis -
Chapter 16 Backlash -
Chapter 17 Contract as Metaphor -
Chapter 18 Rents -
Chapter 19 Rents and Politics -
Chapter 20 Rents and Ownership Concentration -
Chapter 21 Political Change in Continental Europe -
Chapter 22 Alternative Formulations: Data -
VI Corporate Law's Limits -
Chapter 23 Corporate Law as the Foundation for Securities Markets: The Theory -
Chapter 24 Its Limits: Theory -
Chapter 25 Its Limits: Data -
Chapter 26 The Quality of Corporate Law and its Limits -
VII Unifying Two Political Theories -
Chapter 27 Populism and Socialism in Corporate Governance - Conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- Bibliography
- Index
