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Believing by FaithAn Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief$
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John Bishop

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199205547

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 02 August 2021

Integrationist Values: Limiting Permissible Doxastic Venture

Integrationist Values: Limiting Permissible Doxastic Venture

(p.151) 7 Integrationist Values: Limiting Permissible Doxastic Venture
Believing by Faith

John Bishop (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter deals with two versions of the objection that Jamesian fideism is too liberal. In response to the first — that it is arbitrary to permit supra-evidential yet reject irrational, counter-evidential, faith-ventures — it is argued that a defensible fideism must insist that faith-ventures be made with epistemic entitlement (i.e., through the right exercise of epistemic rationality). ‘Ethical suspension of the epistemic’, while not absolutely excluded, does not apply to religious faith-ventures. To meet the second objection — that fideism may endorse obviously morally objectionable faith-ventures — a further integrationist condition is added: both the content and the motivational character of a permissible faith-venture should cohere with correct morality. The chapter concludes by following Kierkegaard's example with a reflection on Abraham and Isaac, to illustrate how theistic faith-ventures should develop in tandem with evolving moral commitments.

Keywords:   Abraham, Isaac, epistemic entitlement, ethical suspension of the epistemic, integrationist values, irrationalist fideism, Kierkegaard, moral commitment

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