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The Metaphysics of Knowledge$
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Keith Hossack

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199206728

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 02 December 2021

‘S knows that A’

‘S knows that A’

(p.1) 1S knows that A
The Metaphysics of Knowledge

Keith Hossack (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter expounds the central thesis that knowledge is a relation of a mind to a fact. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 argues that knowledge is not a propositional attitude. Section 2 classifies knowledge as a relation between a mind and a fact. Section 3 discusses whether the connection between knowledge and mental acts is causal or constitutive. Section 4 discusses epistemic faculties, and section 5 examines defeaters. Section 6 discusses some unsuccessful attempts to define reliability. Section 7 defines reliability as knowing if one believes, and warrant as being disposed to know if one believes. Section 8 concludes that explaining other things in terms of knowledge can be a fruitful strategy.

Keywords:   knowledge, propositional attitude, mind, fact, mental states, epistemic faculties, defeaters, reliability

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