Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Punishment and Freedom$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alan Brudner

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199207251

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207251.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 January 2021

Culpable Mind

Culpable Mind

(p.59) 2 Culpable Mind
Punishment and Freedom

Alan Brudner

Oxford University Press

This chapter criticizes the character and choice theories of the culpable mind as incapable of justifying judicial punishment specifically as opposed to moral censure generally. It develops from legal retributivism an account of the culpable mind requirement that reconciles judicial punishment with the inviolability of the person. The chapter argues that the wrongdoer's choice to interfere or to risk interfering with another agent's capacity to act on ends it chooses is the level of fault required to make punishment implicitly self-imposed by the recipient and thus distinguishable from the wrongdoer's violence. Such a choice is one to which a denial of rights of agency may be logically imputed, a denial by which the wrongdoer implicitly authorizes his own coercibility. Exculpatory conditions are those which block an inference from the agent's choice to a denial of rights. The chapter argues that this version of subjectivism is invulnerable against the criticisms levelled against other versions.

Keywords:   punishment, mens rea, subjectivism, character theory, choice theory, involuntariness, legal insanity, mistake of fact, mistake of law

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .