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Thought and Reality$
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Michael Dummett

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199207275

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207275.001.0001

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Truth‐Conditional Semantics

Truth‐Conditional Semantics

(p.45) 4 Truth‐Conditional Semantics
Thought and Reality

Michael Dummett (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores truth-conditional theories of meaning and content. It argues that truth-conditional theories of meaning and of content are irredeemably circular. It objects to the claim that these theories use the notion of truth without explaining it, because we need not think of a truth-conditional account of sense as a bare specification of truth-conditions, standing on its own; it is better thought of as located within a comprehensive theory of meaning, comprising force and tone as well as sense.

Keywords:   meaning, sentence, language, Frege, truth, sense, content

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