Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Possibility of Knowledge$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Quassim Cassam

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199208319

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 November 2020

The Possibility of Knowledge

The Possibility of Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 The Possibility of Knowledge
Source:
The Possibility of Knowledge
Author(s):

Quassim Cassam (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0001

How-possible questions matter in philosophy because, as Nozick points out, ‘many philosophical problems are ones of understanding how something is or can be possible’. A response to a how-possible question that operates on all levels is what is called a multi-levels response. This chapter defends this approach to epistemological how-possible questions. A multi-levels response operates at three levels. Level 1 identifies means of acquiring the allegedly problematic knowledge. Level 2 is the obstacle-removing level, the level at which obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge by the proposed means are overcome or dissipated. Level 3 seeks to identify necessary background conditions for the acquisition of the relevant knowledge by the proposed means.

Keywords:   how-possible questions, multi-levels response, Kant's problem, perceptual knowledge, anti-minimalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .