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The Possibility of Knowledge$
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Quassim Cassam

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199208319

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001

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Perceptual Knowledge (I): (Space)

Perceptual Knowledge (I): (Space)

(p.85) 3 Perceptual Knowledge (I): (Space)
The Possibility of Knowledge

Quassim Cassam (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

According to Kant, the perception of space is not just an enabling condition for basic primary epistemic seeing but also an enabling condition for epistemic perceiving generally and for the resulting perceptual knowledge. What he is committed to, in other words, is the Spatial Perception Requirement (SPR): in order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. This chapter argues for a qualified version of SPR, that is, a version of SPR that acknowledges the differences between the role of spatial perception in epistemic seeing and its role in other forms of epistemic perceiving. It contends that SPR is defensible. It is also plausible that SPR is at least weakly a priori. Not only can it be established non-empirically, it is doubtful that it can be established by empirical methods.

Keywords:   spatial perception, Kant, Spatial Perception Requirement, perceptual differentiation, minimalism, foundations

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