Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Why Cooperate?The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Scott Barrett

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199211890

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211890.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 January 2022

Mutual restraint: agreeing what states ought not to do

Mutual restraint: agreeing what states ought not to do

(p.133) Chapter Five Mutual restraint: agreeing what states ought not to do
Why Cooperate?

Scott Barrett

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores incentives based on mutual restraint. Some public goods are for free and do not require financing but are hampered with incentive problems. The more the state aims to be more powerful, the greather the rate that others get hold of the public goods and proliferation makes the state more vulnerable. The example given is states wanting nuclear weapons so that they can be called powerful. Each state can be made better off if they agree not to possess such weapons. If states will agree to restrain their behavior on possessing weapons this will avoid conflicts and misconceptions.

Keywords:   incentives, nuclear weapons, restraint, public goods, finances

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .