Since it is typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements, someone who accepts common sense morality and therefore the premises of a modest vindication of morality is entitled to use that argument against Egoism, despite the disagreement of Egoists (and disputes about the form that premise should take). But whilst Egoists can devise modest vindications of Egoism, it is not open to most of them to accept their premises, because it is typically epistemically rational, given the function of those beliefs according to Egoism, to suspend judgement in response to disagreements with moral agents. In other words, it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible forms of Egoism.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.