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The Beloved SelfMorality and the Challenge from Egoism$
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Alison Hills

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199213306

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.001.0001

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Virtue Egoism

Virtue Egoism

(p.65) 4 Virtue Egoism
The Beloved Self

Alison Hills (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

One response to the challenge of Egoism is to deny that there is a distinction between reasons of self-interest and moral reasons. Aristotle, for instance, claimed that the good life, the life of eudaimonia, was also a life of virtue. A tradition of virtue ethics following Aristotle, recently exemplified by Foot and Hursthouse, agrees. This chapter sets out the distinctive claims of virtue ethics, which depends on a conception of the good life that is ‘moralized’, and of a parallel theory – virtue Egoism – which is based on an ‘unmoralized’ account of self-interest.

Keywords:   virtue ethics, virtue egoism, eudaimonia, Aristotle, Foot, Hursthouse

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