A modest vindication of morality is a valid argument based on premises that an Egoist would not accept (but that a defender of common sense morality would): that Egoism is false. Initially it seems straightforward to give modest arguments defending morality, but on reflection these arguments face strong objections. This chapter sets out three such problems. Modest vindications of morality are compared to similar arguments from G. E. Moore defending common sense against idealists and sceptics about the external world. One objection pressed by Wright – that these arguments lack cogency – is discussed in detail, and it is shown that these arguments can at least in principle be cogent.
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