Disagreement
Disagreement
This chapter sets out in detail another serious problem for modest vindications of morality: the problem of disagreement. When there is disagreement of a certain type over whether a proposition is true, it is epistemically rational to suspend judgement about its truth. There is disagreement of this type over the first premises of modest vindications of morality, so it is not rational for anyone to accept that premise, and no one can use the argument against Egoism. It is not possible to vindicate morality, even modestly. This problem of disagreement proves to be much more intractable than issues of cogency discussed in Chapter 6, and ultimately the defence of morality against this problem takes up the remainder of the book.
Keywords: disagreement, epistemic rationality, suspending judgement, modest vindication, morality
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