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Developmental TheismFrom Pure Will to Unbounded Love$
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Peter Forrest

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199214587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214587.001.0001

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The Existence of the Primordial God

The Existence of the Primordial God

(p.92) 5 The Existence of the Primordial God
Developmental Theism

Peter Forrest (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter presents a case for the existence of the neoclassical Primordial God. First, we should either reject reductive materialism or at least not have confidence in it. Hence, we should attach a non-negligible probability to theism of some sort, even before looking at the evidence. Various familiar kinds of evidence increase that probability, and especially likely is the simplest version of theism: the belief that the Primordial God existed. The Problem of Evil is no serious threat to this belief because the Primordial God behaved like a good consequentialist. As part of this case, fine-tuning is replaced by coarse tuning, which is less spectacular but more robust, in two ways. First, it would survive the shift to a theory that had no tunable constants. Second, it resists the many worlds reply to fine-tuning. There is an appendix on the classification dependence of simplicity.

Keywords:   coarse tuning, fine-tuning, many worlds, Problem of Evil, reductive materialism

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