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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic$
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Michael Potter

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199215836

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001

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Russell's theory of judgment

Russell's theory of judgment

(p.118) Chapter 13 Russell's theory of judgment
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Michael Potter (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

In June 1913, Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment led Russell to give up writing his book on Theory of knowledge. It is one of the most famous incidents in their interaction, and has sometimes been presented as a turning point in their relationship, when the roles of master and pupil were reversed. This chapter discusses Russell's original multiple relation theory, his revised theory, Wittgenstein's objection, and the fate of the multiple relation theory. It then considers the attempts by commentators to explain what Wittgenstein's objection amounted to, specifically that of Griffin's.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, Russell, multiple relation theory, Griffin, Theory of knowledge

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