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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic$
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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Michael Potter

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199215836

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001

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Resolving the paradoxes

Resolving the paradoxes

Chapter:
(p.184) Chapter 21 Resolving the paradoxes
Source:
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic
Author(s):

Michael Potter (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.003.0021

The discussion of Wittgenstein's account of quantification in Chapter 20 left unaddressed what sort of theory of types it commits us to. To answer this question we need to look in more detail at the motivation for believing in logical types at all. That motivation derives from Russell's paradox, the problem which had originally attracted Wittgenstein's notice back in 1909. This chapter discusses Russell's theory of types, Wittgenstein's vicious circle principle, types as classes of propositions, types and molecular propositions, types and generality, uniting generality and truth-functions, the general form of proposition, and unsayability.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, Russell, theory of types, vicious circle principle, propositions, generality, truth-functions

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