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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic$
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Michael Potter

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199215836

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001

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Typical ambiguity

Typical ambiguity

(p.196) Chapter 22 Typical ambiguity
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Michael Potter (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores Whitehead and Russell's use of the device of typical ambiguity. The device of typical ambiguity is a response to a difficulty which arises once we accept that the paradoxes prevent us from quantifying over absolutely everything. We find ourselves nonetheless wanting to make assertions that apply to each level in the type-theoretic hierarchy. The problem with typical ambiguity is also considered, namely that the device creates an illusion of unity where, if we take the theory seriously, there is none.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, Russell, White, indefinables

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