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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic$
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Michael Potter

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199215836

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001

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Wittgenstein's theory of judgment

Wittgenstein's theory of judgment

(p.218) Chapter 25 Wittgenstein's theory of judgment
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Michael Potter (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Chapter 13 described how Wittgenstein criticized Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. The nub of Wittgenstein's complaint against Russell's analysis was that in it the verb of the proposition believed did not occur as a verb. Although it is now clear what was wrong with Russell's theory, it still remains to be determined what should be put in its place. This chapter discusses Russell's later views, the theory of judgment in the Notes, and Wittgenstein's later theory of judgment.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein Russell, proposition, theory of judgment, multiple relation

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