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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic$
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Michael Potter

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199215836

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001

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(p.70) Chapter 7 Simplicity
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Michael Potter (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Wittgenstein took the symbolic turn when he used it as a criterion for the simplicity of an object in the world that the object should be symbolized by a simple name. This chapter explores what the idea of simplicity that is at work here amounts to by comparing Wittgenstein's account with Frege's. Both authors offered explanations of how names contribute to the meaning of sentences in which they occur, but where Frege distinguished three distinct items — the referent of the name, its sense, and the idea I associate with it — Wittgenstein had only one, the object which is the name's referent.

Keywords:   Frege, Wittgenstein, realism, solipsism, idealism reconciliation, names

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