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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic$
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Michael Potter

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199215836

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001

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(p.78) Chapter 8 Unity
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Michael Potter (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Merely taking the symbolic turn — to conceive of a proposition as symbolizing what it expresses, rather than being identical with it — is not yet to go very far towards uncovering the structure of propositions. In his letters to Russell during 1912, Wittgenstein was still operating with a Russellian conception of that structure. A proposition he still thought of as a sort of complex. This chapter discusses Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that propositions consist of names related by a copula, citing that there cannot be two different types of things and that the theory of types is superfluous.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, Russell, copula, theory of types

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