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Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic$
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Michael Potter

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199215836

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001

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Fregean propositions

Fregean propositions

(p.86) Chapter 9 Fregean propositions
Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic

Michael Potter (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

One of the central doctrines of Frege's logical theory from 1890 onwards was that a proposition is a name of a truth-value. This chapter analyzes the argument Wittgenstein offers in the Notes to show that this doctrine was misconceived. His argument turns on the use Frege made of the turnstile sign as a symbol to represent assertion.

Keywords:   Frege, assertion, propositions, logical theory

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