Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Personal AgencyThe Metaphysics of Mind and Action$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199217144

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 30 November 2020

Rational Selves and Freedom of Action

Rational Selves and Freedom of Action

(p.179) 9 Rational Selves and Freedom of Action
Personal Agency

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter develops an externalist account of reasons for action in more detail against familiar objections raised against such accounts by internalists and advocates of event-causal theories of intentional action. A libertarian substance-causal approach to the problem of free will is defended in depth against the charges that it reduces free actions to mere chance events and provides no intelligible account of agential control. Finally, it is argued that we are rationally committed to the truth of a libertarian account of rational free action.

Keywords:   causation, chance, choice, control, externalism, free will, intentional action, libertarianism, reasons for action

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .