Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Personal AgencyThe Metaphysics of Mind and Action$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199217144

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 September 2020

Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth

Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth

(p.199) 10 Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth
Personal Agency

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the important distinction between practical and theoretical reason and rationality. As a consequence, a modification is made to the version of externalism regarding reasons for action advocated elsewhere in the book. It is contended that the sorts of items that properly qualify as reasons for actions, externalistically conceived, must differ fundamentally from those that properly qualify as reasons for belief, and that these items are needs rather than facts. It is also argued that this ontological difference between reasons for action and reasons for belief goes hand-in-hand with equally fundamental differences between the logic of action and the logic of belief.

Keywords:   logic of action, logic of belief, reasons for action, reasons for belief

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .