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Personal AgencyThe Metaphysics of Mind and Action$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199217144

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

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The Self as an Emergent Substance

The Self as an Emergent Substance

(p.92) 5 The Self as an Emergent Substance
Personal Agency

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explains why traditional arguments in favour of substance dualism are avoided in this book. In their place a new argument is presented which, however, supports only a non-Cartesian version of this view, according to which beings like ourselves — persons or, more generally, subjects of experience — are bearers of both psychological and physical properties, while nonetheless being distinct from our biological bodies and any parts of them. It is then explained why this view is well-suited to accommodating the dualistic psychophysical interactionism defended in the earlier chapters. The chapter concludes with a new and intuitively compelling argument against physicalist theories of mind. This completes Part I of the book.

Keywords:   emergentism, interactionism, persons, physicalism, substance dualism

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