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Personal AgencyThe Metaphysics of Mind and Action$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199217144

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

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Event Causation and Agent Causation

Event Causation and Agent Causation

(p.121) 6 Event Causation and Agent Causation
Personal Agency

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins by characterizing event causation and agent causation, and then looks at strategies for attempting to reduce one of these species of causation to the other. In the end, arguments are presented in favour of the view that talk in terms of event causation — to the extent that it should strictly be countenanced at all — is best understood as elliptical for talk in terms of agent causation, although only where the word ‘agent’ is very broadly construed, rather than being confined in its application to the much narrower class of rational agents, ourselves included.

Keywords:   agents, events, persons, rational action, reduction

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