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Personal AgencyThe Metaphysics of Mind and Action$
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E. J. Lowe

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199217144

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 October 2020

Personal Agency

Personal Agency

(p.141) 7 Personal Agency
Personal Agency

E. J. Lowe (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter builds upon the account of agent causation developed in the preceding chapter in order to draw an initial sketch of the view of rational human action favoured in the book — a view which falls midway between volitionism and classical agent causalism, while simultaneously endorsing libertarianism with regard to the question of free will and externalism concerning the nature of reasons for action.

Keywords:   agent causation, externalism, free will, libertarianism, rational action, reasons for action, volitionism

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