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The Normative WebAn Argument for Moral Realism$
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Terence Cuneo

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199218837

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.001.0001

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Epistemic Expressivism: Nontraditional Views

Epistemic Expressivism: Nontraditional Views

Chapter:
(p.145) 6 Epistemic Expressivism: Nontraditional Views
Source:
The Normative Web
Author(s):

Terence Cuneo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0007

This chapter engages with the second version of epistemic expressivism, the so-called non-traditional epistemic expressivism. This view is distinguished from traditional expressivism inasmuch as it holds that epistemic discourse is assertoric, that there are epistemic truths, and that there are epistemic facts — albeit in deflationary senses of these terms. After having explicated what it is for there to be deflationary truths and facts, the chapter argues that non-traditional epistemic expressivism is vulnerable to serious objections. These objections charge that for all its sophistication, non-traditional epistemic expressivism is not much more plausible than its traditional cousin.

Keywords:   actualism, non-traditional epistemic expressivism, epistemic truths, epistemic facts, deflationism, quasi-facts, quasi-propositions, representation, truth

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