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The Normative WebAn Argument for Moral Realism$
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Terence Cuneo

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199218837

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.001.0001

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Epistemic Reductionism

Epistemic Reductionism

Chapter:
(p.185) 7 Epistemic Reductionism
Source:
The Normative Web
Author(s):

Terence Cuneo (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218837.003.0008

Reductionist views are the least radical of the antirealist camp. They maintain that there are moral facts, but deny that these facts are or generate categorical reasons. This chapter develops the epistemic counterpart to this view. It argues that while more plausible than more radical antirealist views, epistemic reductionism is incompatible with both externalist and internalist accounts of epistemic justification, and yields an unattractive version of epistemic relativism. These are important reasons for not accepting it.

Keywords:   categorical reasons, reductionist views, externalism, internalism

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