Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Images of EmpiricismEssays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Bradley Monton

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199218844

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 October 2020

Must Empiricism Be a Stance, and Could it Be One? How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time

Must Empiricism Be a Stance, and Could it Be One? How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time

(p.271) 13 Must Empiricism Be a Stance, and Could it Be One? How to Be an Empiricist and a Philosopher at the Same Time
Images of Empiricism

Anja Jauernig

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins by examining van Fraassen's claims that being an empiricist cannot amount to believing a central empiricist dogma (‘naïve empiricism’), but should be understood as consisting in taking the empiricist/empirical stance (‘stance empiricism’). It argues that not all versions of naïve empiricism run into the problems identified by van Fraassen, and that the stance empiricist is in at least as bad a position as the naïve or dogmatic empiricist with respect to the task of providing a ‘ radical critique of metaphysics’, which, according to van Fraassen, is one of the central desiderata for any empiricist position. That is, contrary to what van Fraassen claims, one is not forced to renounce naïve empiricism as a conception of what empiricism is, or could be, and replacing naïve empiricism by stance empiricism does not promise any advantage with respect to the required radical critique of metaphysics. But even if van Fraassen's more specific arguments fail, his proposal that empiricism in particular, and philosophical positions in general, should be understood as stances rather than dogmata merits attention and close scrutiny. Finally, the chapter takes a closer look at the question of whether a philosophical position can possibly consist in a stance, that is, of whether a stance can satisfy the conditions and serve the functions that we expect a philosophical position to satisfy and serve. The answer appears to be that stances cannot fulfill these expectations.

Keywords:   naïve empiricism, The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen, value judgements, philosophical positions, stances

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .