Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oughts and ThoughtsScepticism and the Normativity of Meaning$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Anandi Hattiangadi

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780199219025

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 09 August 2020

Can we do Without Semantic Facts?

Can we do Without Semantic Facts?

(p.65) 4 Can we do Without Semantic Facts?
Oughts and Thoughts

Anandi Hattiangadi (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter to what we mean? It is argued that the ‘no fact thesis’ is irremediably incoherent, since, if semantic realism is rejected, no statement can be true or justified, even in the weakest sense. Thus, there is no hope for a ‘sceptical solution’ which purports to show that although semantic realism is false, our ascriptions of meaning and content are nevertheless legitimate. Since the appearance of a paradox in the sceptical conclusion cannot be resolved, the chapter provisionally concludes that the argument must falter somewhere.

Keywords:   Kripke, sceptical solution, sceptical argument, sceptical conclusion, non-factualism, deflationism, meaning

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .